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Abstract
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models.
Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are
plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar
results in the literature and allow the use of truthful equilibria in novel
economic applications. Moreover, I provide two such applications. The first
application is a market game in which multiple sellers sell a uniform good
to a single buyer. The second application is a lobbying model in which
there are externalities in contributions between lobbies. This last example
indicates that externalities between principals do not necessarily prevent
efficient equilibria. In this regard, this paper provides a set of conditions,
under which, truthful equilibria in common agency models with externalities
are efficient.
1 Introduction
The common agency model is a game in which many principals share a common
agent. Economists apply this model in many areas of economic research like
lobbying, industrial organization, public economics e.t.c.
Common agency models often have many equilibria. However, truthful equi-
libria are probably the most popular among them. This type of equilibria was
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introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for quasi linear utility functions
and was generalized to all utility functions by Dixit et al. (1997). Specifically,
Dixit et al. (1997) argued that truthful equilibria are focal because they have
three important properties: they are easy to calculate, Pareto efficient and plau-
sible. The last property means that the best response set of the principals always
contains a strategy which is consistent with truthful equilibria (truthful strategy).
However, the analysis by Dixit et al. (1997) was motivated by lobbying games.
Following this motivation, they based their results on a general setting associated
with lobbying models. This setting consists of three key assumptions. First, the
utility of the principals (lobbyists) decreases with the bids (contributions) they
offer to the agent (politician). Second, the utility of the principals depends only
on their own bids. Third, the utility of the agent is increasing in all bids offered
by the principals.
Nevertheless, many applications of common agency do not fit this restricted
framework. Thus, a question arises. Is it possible to find a broader set of conditions
under which truthful equilibria can be used? In this paper, I attempt to answer
this question. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which the results of
Dixit et al. (1997) survive. These conditions allow the use of truthful equilibria in
novel economic applications.
In this paper I consider two such applications. The first application is a market
game in which a group of principals (sellers), sells a uniform good to a single agent
(buyer). The sellers move first and present the buyer with a bid (price) which
is conditioned on the amount that the buyer wishes to buy. Then, the buyer
decides on the quantity he buys from each seller. This situation is the reverse
of the lobbying model by Dixit et al. (1997), since typically, the utility of the
sellers increases, while the utility of the buyers decreases following a rise in prices.
The properties of truthful equilibria in such market games were established by
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) for quasi linear utility functions. Here I follow
Dixit et al. (1997) and generalize them to all utility functions.
The second application considers externalities in bids, among principals. These
externalities occur naturally when principals are interrelated in other ways besides
sharing a common agent. For example, think of a federal country in which the
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states (principals) lobby the central government (agent) for a transfer. Moreover,
assume that the states finance voluntarily a public good like public safety. In this
case, all states benefit from public safety spending in the other states. However,
this spending depends on the available resources of each state. In turn, these
available resources decrease with lobbying. Thus, the welfare in each state depends
on lobbying expenditures in all states. Therefore, externalities in bids, in this case
spending for lobbying, emerge.
The use of truthful equilibria in the two applications above is not equally
intuitive. Specifically, in market games the setting resembles the model of Dixit
et al. (1997). Thus, the fact that truthful equilibria retain their properties does
not come as a surprise. However, externalities in bids is a different story. In such
models the literature has identified efficiency failures1 and thus the efficiency of
truthful equilibria is less expected. In particular, externalities in bids can lead
to inefficiency because of a possible prisoners’ dilemma. The set of conditions I
provide in this paper imply that this prisoners’ dilemma need not always appear.
Thus, there exist applications with externalities in bids, in which truthful equilibria
have all three properties identified by Dixit et al. (1997), including efficiency.
In this regard, my model belongs in the strand of literature that explores
the robustness of truthful equilibria to various extensions of the original com-
mon agency model. Dixit et al. (1997) pioneered this literature by extending the
model of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to general utility functions. Other im-
portant examples of this literature include Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) who
consider dynamic common agency, Prat and Rustichini (2003) who discuss multi-
ple agents and Martimort and Stole (2009b) who consider asymmetric information.
Furthermore, my paper relates to the literature discussing common agency with
externalities in bids. Examples of this literature are Peters (2001), Martimort and
Stole (2002), Peters and Szentes (2012), Szentes (2014) and Galperti (2015). The
papers in this strand of literature discuss models with asymmetric information
and observe that externalities in bids can lead to inefficient equilibria. Following
this observation, they allow bids to depend on the bidding strategies of the other
1 See Peters (2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002).
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principals in order to restore efficiency. These papers relate to my work, to the
extent that their results also apply to symmetric information models. In this re-
spect, my contribution is that truthful equilibria can be efficient, even if bids do
not depend on other bidding strategies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the main
model, section 3 presents the key results and section 4 investigates a variation of
the main model. Section 5 discusses the general issue of efficiency of equilibria
and the relationship between my paper and the existing literature on externali-
ties. Section 6 considers economic applications and section 7 concludes. Finally,
appendix A contains the main proof of the paper, while appendix B, which is not
intended for publication, contains the rest of the proofs along with some examples
and calculations.
2 Model
2.1 Setting
Before I continue with the details of the model, let me introduce the notation that
I use in the rest of the paper. The index i runs from 1 to n. Furthermore, except
when otherwise stated, I use Latin and Greek letters in the following manner.
Consider for example the lower-case letter “x”. Then, xi is a real number, x
is the vector of all xi, x−i is the vector containing all members of x except xi,
x˜ =
∑
i xi and x˜−j =
∑
i 6=j xi. Moreover, I use the symbol xi(·) to describe a
function xi : Z → R, such that xi = xi(z), for a given set Z. The symbols x(·)
and x−i(·) describe the respective vectors of functions. Finally, if x, y are two
vectors, then x ≥ y means that xi ≥ yi for all i, while x > y means that xi ≥ yi
for all i and there exists at least one i, such that xi > yi.
I turn now to the model. Consider a common agency model with one agent
and n principals. Following Dixit et al. (1997) I discuss here what is known as a
public common agency model2. I depart from this assumption in section 4.
2 In public common agency models the principals condition their bids on the
entire action of the agent, while in private common agency, the principals
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Agent. The agent chooses an element a from the set A. The set A reflects
budget, institutional or other constraints that depend on specific applications. For
example, if the agent is a government choosing a tax rate, the set A is the interval
[0, 1]. Likewise, if the agent is a buyer who is buying a quantity of a good from
each of the principals, the set A is a subset of Rn+. Henceforth, I refer to a as the
agent’s action.
The utility function of the agent is a function:
u0 : A×Rn → R such that uo = u0(a, b).
The vector b ∈ Rn, is the vector of bids that the principals submit to the agent
in order to influence the choice of a. This utility function is strictly monotonous
with respect to all bids and continuous with respect to all its elements.
Principals. On the other hand, each principal chooses a bidding function:
bi : A→ R such that bi = bi(a),
in order to influence the agent. These bidding functions meet appropriate restric-
tions. Specifically, there exist two functions bi : A→ R and bi : A→ R, which are
uniformly bounded above and below by bmax, bmin ∈ R respectively and satisfy
the inequality bi(a) ≥ bi(a) for all a ∈ A. These functions define feasible bids:
Definition 1. Feasibility : A bid bi ∈ R is feasible relative to a ∈ A, if
bi ∈ [bi(a), bi(a)]. Moreover, a bidding function bi(·) is feasible, if bi(a) is fea-
sible relative to a, for all a ∈ A.
Additionally, the vector b ∈ Rn is feasible relative to a ∈ A if all bi are feasible
relative to a. In this case I say that the pair (a, b) is feasible. A feasible pair (a, b)
is symmetric if bi = bj for all i, j. Similarly, the vector of bidding functions b(·)
is feasible, if all its elements are feasible. Moreover, if b(·) is feasible and a ∈ A, I
say that (a, b(·)) and (a, bi(·)) are feasible. A feasible pair (a, b(·)) is symmetric
condition their bids only on a part of the agent’s action (i.e. the part they
observe). For more on the meaning of these terms see Martimort and Stole
(2009a).
5
if bi(·) = bj(·) for all i, j.
Feasibility restrictions in bids reflect application specific constraints. For ex-
ample, if the principals are lobbies offering campaign contributions, the bids must
be positive and not exceed the budget constraint of the lobby. Likewise, if the
principals are sellers and the bids are selling prices, the bids should be greater
than the cost of acquisition and smaller than the buyer’s reservation price.
Now I turn to the utility functions of the principals. Specifically, the utility
function of principal i is a function:
ui : A×Rn → R such that ui = ui(a, b).
This utility function is strictly monotonous with respect to own bids bi and con-
tinuous with respect to both a and b.
Timing. Finally, the timing of the model is standard. There are two stages.
In stage one, the principals submit simultaneously their bidding functions. In
stage two, the agent chooses his action and the bids are realised.
Following the analysis above, my model is fully described by the number of
principals n, the n + 1 utility functions, the set A and the restrictions in bids
(bi(·), bi(·), bmax, bmin). Henceforth, I use the term game, whenever I refer to a
common agency model defined in such a way.
This game extends the model by Dixit et al. (1997) in two ways. First, the
utility of each principal also depends on the bids of all other principals. Thus,
my model allows for externalities among principals. Second, I make no prior
assumptions, regarding the effect of bids on utility, other than monotonicity. These
extensions broaden the range of applications to which truthful equilibria apply. I
discuss these issues again in 2.4 which provides further specification of the model
and in section 6 which discusses economic applications.
Let me now turn to the equilibrium of the game.
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2.2 Equilibrium
The definitions of best response and equilibrium below extend the respective def-
initions by Dixit et al. (1997) 3.
Definition 2. Best response: A feasible bidding function bi(·), belongs in
the best response set of principal i, to the feasible bidding functions b−i(·) of the
other principals, if:
There exists an a´ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b(a)), such that there does not exist a feasible
pair (a∗, b∗i (·)), such that ui(a∗, b∗i (a∗), b−i(a∗)) > ui(a´, b(a´ )) and a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
∗
i (a), b−i(a))
.
Definition 3. Equilibrium : A feasible pair (ao, bo(·)) is an equilibrium if:
a) ao ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o(a)) and
b) for all i, there does not exist a feasible pair (a´, bi(·)), such that a´ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, bi(a), b
o
−i(a))
and ui(a´, bi(a´ ), b
o
−i(a´ )) > ui(a
o, b(ao )).
Let me now turn to the notion of truthful equilibrium.
2.3 Truthful equilibrium
Truthful equilibria refine the equilibria described in definition 3. They were in-
troduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and were generalized by Dixit et
al. (1997). In truthful equilibria the principals submit truthful bidding functions.
These functions exactly reflect changes in the utility of the principals that follow
from changes in the actions of the agent. Thus, truthful bidding functions reveal
the true preferences of the principals. Definitions 4 and 5 below adapt these ideas
to my setting.
Let (a, b(·)) be a feasible pair and u∗i ∈ R. Consider the equation u∗i =
ui(a, φi, b−i(a)), with respect to φi. Since b(·) is a vector of feasible bidding func-
tions, b−i(a) exists for all a ∈ A. Furthermore, because the utility of the principals
3 On the definitions 2 and 3 see also Ko (2011) and Ko (2017).
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is monotonous in own bids, this equation always has a unique solution. This solu-
tion defines a function φi : A → R such that φi = φi(a;u∗i , b−i(·)). Then, I define
truthful responses as follows:
Definition 4. Truthful response: A bidding function bTi : A → R, is a
truthful response of principal i to the feasible bidding functions b−i(·) of the other
principals, relative to the constant u∗i , if :
a)
bTi =

bi(a) if ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a)) < u∗i
φi(a;u
∗
i , b−i(·)) if ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a)) ≤ u∗i ≤ ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a))
bi(a) if u
∗
i < ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a))
and ui(·) is strictly decreasing in own bids, or
b)
bTi =

bi(a) if ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a)) > u∗i
φi(a;u
∗
i , b−i(·)) if ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a)) ≥ u∗i ≥ ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a))
bi(a) if u
∗
i > ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a))
and ui(·) is strictly increasing in own bids.
Definition 4 states that truthful responses are equal to the expression φi(a;u
∗
i , b−i(·))
except when this expression violates lower or upper feasibility bounds. In such
cases the truthful responses are equal to these bounds. Therefore, truthful re-
sponses are by construction feasible bidding functions4.
Now I can turn to the definition of truthful equilibrium.
Definition 5. Truthful equilibrium : Let (ao, bo(·)) be an equilibrium of
the game and uo = u(ao, bo(a)) be the vector of equilibrium utility levels of the
4 Ko (2011) explains the advantages of definition 4 when compared to bTi =
min{bi(a),max{bi(a), φi(a;ui, b−i(·))}} which corresponds to the definition
provided by Dixit et al. (1997).
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principals. This equilibrium is truthful, if for all i, the equilibrium bidding func-
tion boi (·) is a truthful response of principal i to the equilibrium bidding functions
bo−i(·) of the other principals, relative to his equilibrium utility level uoi .
Let me clarify the notion of truthful equilibrium. Consider any feasible pair
(a, b(·)) and let u = u(a, b(a)), be the vector of corresponding utility levels. Then,
definition 4 determines the truthful response, for each principal, to the bidding
functions b−i(·) of the other principals, relative to ui. For a given a, this operation
defines a mapping from the n-dimensional space of feasible bidding functions to
itself. Now consider an equilibrium pair (ao, bo(·)) and let uo = u(ao, bo(ao)). If
bo(·) is a fixed point in the mapping above, then it is a truthful equilibrium5.
Next, I discuss the structure of the game.
2.4 Additional assumptions
Here, I provide some additional assumptions that often characterize applications.
Assumption A. Opposing monotonicity
A1. Lobbying. The utility of all principals is strictly decreasing in own bids and
the utility of the agent is strictly increasing in all bids. Moreover, bi(a) = bmin,
for all i and a ∈ A.
5 The existence of such a fixed point deals with the issue of infinite regress that
can appear in common agency with externalities. For the problem of infinite
regress in common agency see Peters (2001), Martimort and Stole (2002) and
more recently Szentes (2014) and Galperti (2015). In these papers the bidding
functions explicitly depend on other bidding functions. Therefore, infinite
regress can appear because the bidding function of principal i depends on the
bidding function of principal j, which in turn depends on the bidding function
of principal i and so on. My setting does not allow for explicit dependence on
other bidding functions. However, the principals form guesses about the other
bidding functions which also depend on the guesses that the other principals
form and so on.
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A2. Market. The utility of all principals is strictly increasing in own bids and
the utility of the agent is strictly decreasing in all bids. Moreover, bi(a) = bmax,
for all i and a ∈ A.
Assumption A1 is often satisfied in lobbying models. In these models the prin-
cipals are lobbies and their bids are usually campaign contributions to politicians.
In such a case, the politicians like receiving contributions while the lobbies dislike
paying them. Moreover, contributions must be non-negative and therefore, the
common lower bound bmin is zero. Assumption A2 is more relevant in market
games, in which the principals are sellers of a homogeneous good and their bids
are selling prices. In this case, the sellers like high prices while the buyer dislikes
them. Furthermore, the upper bound of the bids is the buyer’s reservation price.
Henceforth, when I refer to assumptions A1 and A2, I use the terms lobbying
and market monotonicity respectively.
Assumption B. No externalities.
The utility of the principals takes the form ui : A×R→ R such that ui = ui(a, bi).
Assumption B describes a special case without externalities in bids. The com-
bination of lobbying monotonicity and no externalities defines the lobbying model
discussed by Dixit et al. (1997).
Assumption C. Conflict of interests at (a, b).
Let (a, b) be a feasible pair. If there exists a feasible pair (a, b´ ) such that u0(a, b´ ) >
u0(a, b) then there exists an i such that ui(a, b´ ) < ui(a, b) and if there exists a
feasible pair (a, b´ ) such that u(a, b´ ) > u(a, b) then u0(a, b´ ) < u0(a, b).
Assumption C states that for a given agent’s action, it is impossible to change
bids, in a way that makes both the principals and the agent better off. There-
fore, this assumption introduces conflict of interests between principals and agent,
over bids. Assumption C is implied by opposing monotonicity in games without
externalities. However, in games with externalities this is not always the case.
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In order to explain the role of externalities in this issue, let me consider a
game with lobbying monotonicity. First, assume that there are no externalities.
Also, fix the agent’s action at a certain level and consider a change in bids which
makes the agent better off. Such a change requires that at least one bid (bi) in-
creases. Then, since ui = ui(a, bi), the utility of at least one principal decreases.
Thus, these changes are consistent with conflict of interests. Alternatively, con-
sider a similar game with externalities. In this case, the utility of principal i is
ui = ui(a, bi, b−i). Furthermore, assume that the utility of all principals is increas-
ing in all the elements of b−i. Also, assume that all contributions increase. Then,
two conflicting effects emerge. On the one hand, the increase in own bids has a
negative effect on the utility of the principals. On the other hand, the increase in
the other bids has a positive effect on the principals. If the positive cross effect
dominates the negative own effect, for all principals, then conflict of interests is
violated. In such a case, an increase in all bids increases the utility of all principals
and the agent. Assumption C appropriately restricts externalities to disallow such
situations. This assumption along with assumption D that follows guarantee the
efficiency of truthful equilibria in games with externalities.
Assumption D. Deep pockets
D 1. Weak deep pockets at (ao, bo(·)).
Let (ao, bo(·)) be a truthful equilibrium and (a∗, b∗) be a feasible pair such that
u0(a
∗, b∗) ≥ u0(ao, bo(ao)) and u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(ao, bo(ao)) with at least one strict in-
equality, then u(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ u(a∗, bo(a∗)).
D 2. Strong deep pockets
There exists ui ∈ R such that:
D 2.1. If the utility of all principals is strictly decreasing in own bids then
ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a)) = ui ≤ ui(a, b(a)) for all i, a ∈ A and feasible b−i(·).
D 2.2. If the utility of all principals is strictly increasing in own bids then
ui(a, bi(a), b−i(a)) = ui ≤ ui(a, b(a)) for all i, a ∈ A and feasible b−i(·).
The term “deep pockets” is due to Ko (2011) who uses a similar assumption.
Furthermore, Dixit et al. (1997) also employ a version of strong deep pockets.
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Specifically, Dixit et al. (1997) assume that there is a subsistence utility level ui
and define bi(·) implicitly through ui(a, bi(a)) = ui. If a game satisfies strong deep
pockets then it also satisfies weak deep pockets. However, as I show later on,
many applications satisfy weak deep pockets directly. These applications include
all games without externalities but also a number of games with externalities.
Definition 6 introduces some terms that I use in assumptions E and F below.
Definition 6. Game structure:
a) A game is differentiable if all utility functions are differentiable with respect
to all bids.
b) A game is cumulative if the utility functions of the agent and the principals
are as follows:
u0 : A×R→ R such that u0 = u0(a, b˜) and
ui : A×R2 → R such that ui = ui(a, bi, b˜−i) for all i.
c) A game exhibits negative externalities if it is differentiable, cumulative and
the utility of all principals is strictly decreasing in the total bids of the other prin-
cipals (b˜−i).
d) A game exhibits positive externalities if it is differentiable, cumulative and
and the utility of all principals is strictly increasing in the total bids of the other
principals (b˜−i).
e) A game is symmetric if ui(·) = uj(·), bi(·) = bj(·) and bi(·) = bj(·) for all i, j.
f) A game is quasi-concave if it is cumulative and the utility functions of all
principals are quasi-concave with respect to own and other bids.
Assumption E. Small externalities
Either the game exhibits negative externalities and
∣∣∣∣∣∂ui∂bi
∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂b˜−i
∣∣∣∣∣ for all i and all
feasible (a, b) or the game exhibits positive externalities and
∣∣∣∣∣∂ui∂bi
∣∣∣∣∣ > (n−1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂b˜−i
∣∣∣∣∣
for all i and all feasible (a, b).
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Assumption E is a special case of conflict of interests. Specifically, small exter-
nalities describe a situation in which the effect of own bids appropriately dominates
the respective cross effects. In this respect, think of (n − 1)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂b˜−i
∣∣∣∣∣ as the total
cross effect and of
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂ui∂b˜−i
∣∣∣∣∣ as the average cross effect. These two effects coincide
when n = 2. As it turns out, this restriction in externalities achieves the conflict
between agent and principals which is necessary to satisfy assumption C.
Assumption F. Symmetric negative externalities
The game is symmetric, quasi concave and exhibits negative externalities.
Proposition 1 that follows explains the relationship between assumptions A-F.
Proposition 1.
(i) Strong deep pockets imply weak deep pockets at all truthful equilibria.
(ii) The combination of opposing monotonicity and no externalities, implies con-
flict of interests at all feasible pairs (a, b) and weak deep pockets at all truthful
equilibria.
(iii)The combination of small externalities and lobbying monotonicity implies con-
flict of interests at all feasible pairs (a, b) and weak deep pockets at all truthful
equilibria.
(iv)The combination of symmetric negative externalities and lobbying monotonic-
ity implies conflict of interests at all symmetric pairs (a, b) and weak deep pockets
at all symmetric truthful equilibria.
Proof: See appendix B.1.1. Also, Dixit et al. (1997) prove a part of (ii) by show-
ing that lobbying monotonicity and no extermalities imply conflict of intersts and
weak deep pockets during their proof of the efficiency of truthful equilibria6.
I turn now to the main results.
6 For their proof see Dixit et al. (1996)
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3 Results
Dixit et al. (1997), like Bernheim and Whinston (1986) before them, argue that
truthful equilibria are focal, because they share three key properties. Namely,
truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient7.
Dixit et al. (1997) arrive at this result under the assumptions of lobbying
monotonicity and no externalities. Here I generalize their argument by providing
a broader set of conditions under which it is valid. The four propositions that
follow achieve this task.
Proposition 2. Plausibility
Consider a game that exhibits opposing monotonicity. Then, the best response set
of principal i to the bidding functions of the other principals b−i(·) always contains
a truthful response.
Proof: see appendix B.1.2.
Proposition 3. Calculation
Consider a game that exhibits opposing monotonicity.
A. If the feasible pair (ao, bo(·)) is an equilibrium then (Ai) and (Aii) below are
true:
(Ai) ao ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o(a))
(Aii) For all i, lobbying monotonicity implies that u0(a
o, bo(ao)) = max
a∈A
u0(a, bmin, b−i(a))
and market monotonicity implies that u0(a
o, bo(ao)) = max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b−i(a))
B. Let bo(·) be a vector of feasible bidding functions, such that for all i, boi (·) is a
truthful response to bo−i(·), relative to uoi ∈ R. Also let ao ∈ A be an agent’s action
such that the pair (ao, bo(·)) is feasible and satisfies (Ai) and (Aii) above. Then if
(Bi) and (Bii) below are true (ao, bo(·)) is a truthful equilibrium of the game.
7 A part of the literature expresses doubts regarding the relevance of truthful
equilibria. In this respect Kirchsteiger and Prat (2001) provide an experimen-
tal argument and Martimort and Stole (2009b) provide a theoretical argument
against truthful equilibria.
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(Bi) uo = u(ao, bo(ao))
(Bii) There does not exist an a ∈ A such that the pair (a, bo(·)) is feasible, satisfies
conditions (Ai) and (Aii) and yields u(a, bo(a)) > uo.
Proof: See appendix B.1.3.
Lemma to proposition 3B
If the game satisfies strong seep pockets then condition (Bii) is always satisfied.
Proof: See the proof of part (i) of proposition 1 in appendix B.1.1.
These results are true regardless of other characteristics of the game i.e. the
existence of externalities. In more detail, proposition 2 states that the principals
stand to loose nothing from responding truthfully to any bidding function chosen
by the other principals. Also, the intuition behind proposition 3A is standard.
In particular, principal i submits a bid that matches the agent’s outside option.
Principal i has no motive to improve his bid any further.
Proposition 3A holds for all equilibria. Proposition 3B states that the converse
of 3A holds only for truthful equilibria and only under certain conditions. In order
to explain how proposition 3B works let me give two examples: First, consider
a game with two principals with utility functions ui = a − bi and an agent with
utility function u0 = b1 + b2. Moreover, assume that a ∈ [0, 1] and bi ∈ [0, a].
This game satisfies strong deep pockets since ui(a, bi) ≥ 0 for all feasible (a, bi),
bi(a) = a and ui(a, bi(a)) = 0 for all a ∈ A. Moreover, in this game the bidding
functions bi = 0 for all a ∈ [0, 1] are truthful responses to each other relative to
uoi = 1 and satisfy conditions (Ai) and (Aii) for all a ∈ [0, 1] . Then, proposition
3B implies that only a = 1 for which ui = 1 = u
o
i is part of a truthful equilibrium
with equilibrium utility uoi = 1.
Second, consider an example in which condition (Bii) fails. In particular con-
sider a game in which the utility of the principals and the range of a are as in
the previous example, while bi ∈ [0, 12 ] and u0 =
{
b1 + b2 − 2a if 0 ≤ a ≤ 12
b1 + b2 − 1 if 12 < a ≤ 1
.
Under these assumptions the bidding functions boi (a) =
{
a if 0 ≤ a ≤ 1
2
1
2
if 1
2
< a ≤ 1 are
truthful responses to each other relative to uoi = 0. Additionally, the pair (a, b
o(·))
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satisfies conditions (Ai) and (Aii) for all a ∈ [0, 1] and condition (Bi) for all a ∈
[0, 1
2
]. However, condition (Bii) fails because for example, for a = 1, ui(1, b
o
i (1)) =
0.5 > uoi = 0. Following this failure, the bidding functions b
o(·) do not yield a
truthful equilibrium. In order to verify this fact, consider a deviation by one of
the principals to the truthful biding function with respect to ui = 0.5.
Proposition 3A and especially proposition 3B are very helpful in the calculation
of truthful equilibria. In this respect, I provide examples in section 6 and appendix
B.3.
Now I turn to efficiency.
Proposition 4. Efficiency
Consider a game which exhibits conflict of interests and weak deep pockets at
(ao, bo(·)), which is a truthful equilibrium of this game. Then, there does not
exist a feasible pair (a∗, b∗), such that u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(ao, bo(ao)) and u0(a∗, b∗) ≥
u0(a
o, bo(ao)), with at least one strict inequality.
Proof: See appendix A
Proposition 4 states that under certain conditions, truthful equilibria imple-
ment an allocation which is Pareto efficient for all participants of the game (princi-
pals and agent). Definition 7 and proposition 5 below summarize the results so far.
Definition 7. Validity
A truthful equilibrium of a game is valid, if it satisfies propositions 3 and 4 and
the game satisfies proposition 2.
Proposition 5. Results
a) All truthful equilibria are valid in all games that satisfy one of the following:
(i) lobbying monotonicity and no externalities
(ii) market monotonicity and no externalities8
8 For similar results in models with quasi linear utility functions see also Bern-
heim and Whinston (1986), Laussel and Le Breton (2001), Martimort and
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(iii) lobbying monotonicity and small externalities9
b) Symmetric truthful equilibria are valid in games that satisfy symmetric nega-
tive externalities and lobbying monotonicity.
Proof: Follows directly from propositions 1-4.
Part (a-i) of proposition 5 restates the argument by Dixit et al. (1997) in
favour of truthful equilibria in the standard model, while parts (a-ii), (a-iii) and
(b) generalize this argument in different settings. The intuition behind proposition
5 is straightforward for the case of market monotonicity and no externalities. This
case is the reverse of the model by Dixit et al. (1997) and thus its motivation is
similar. In the case of small externalities the intuition is also simple. Specifically, if
the externalities are small they have no effect. I discuss this issue further in section
5. For the case of symmetric externalities I provide examples that highlight the
role of both symmetry and quasi-concavity in achieving conflict of interests, in
appendix B.2.2.
Proposition 5 describes 4 general settings in which truthful equilibria are rel-
evant. However, other such settings might also exist. In this respect, interested
researchers can check whether a specific application satisfies any or all of proposi-
tions 2-4 directly.
In section 6, I discuss economic economic applications of proposition 5. Now,
I turn to a variation of the main model.
4 Private common agency
The analysis so far implies that the principals condition their bids on the entire
agent’s action. For example, in a market game, the principals condition their sell-
ing prices, both on the quantity they sell themselves to the agent, but also on the
quantity all other principals sell to the agent. In section 6, I consider an example
Stole (2003), Segal and Whinston (2003) and Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009).
9 Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) also find that small externalities lead to effi-
cient equilibria in their study of efficient equilibria in Vickrey auctions. I am
indebted to professor de Frutos for pointing that to me.
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which is consistent with this assumption. However, in many cases the sellers can-
not observe the trade between other parties. Moreover, government regulations
might forbid the use of such information in contracts. For these reasons, I consider
here a variation of the game, named private common agency.
In this modified version of the game, the agent’s action a is a vector of dimen-
sion (n), which is equal to the number of principals. Formally,
a = (a1, a2, ..., ai, ..., an) ∈ A = ×Ai ⊂ Rn.
Moreover, the bidding functions of the principals take the form:
bi : Ai → R such that bi = bi(ai)
and the utility function of principal i is:
ui : Ai ×R→ R such that ui = ui(ai, bi).
Finally, the two functions that define feasibility are:
bi : Ai → R and bi : Ai → R.
The rest of the setting is as in section 2.
I call the game defined above a private game. In this new setting the defini-
tions of all other concepts that appear in section 2 must be modified appropriately.
These modifications are straightforward, so I omit them and jump directly to the
main result.
Proposition 6. Validity in private games
All truthful equilibria in private games that exhibit opposing monotonicity are
valid.
Proof: See appendix B.1.4
Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009), also study private games and find that all equilib-
ria are efficient and that truthful equilibria satisfy proposition 3A. Their setting
differs from mine in two ways. First, Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009) assume that the
principals also choose a subset of Ai on which they condition their bids. Second,
in their model, these authors allow only for quasi linear utility functions.
I turn now to a further discussion of efficiency.
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5 Discussion
In this section I discuss games with externalities that do not satisfy propositions
2-4. Specifically, I investigate the existence of efficient equilibria in such games.
As it turns out, efficient equilibria might or might not exist depending on the
specifics of the model. I discuss this issue with the help of two examples. These
examples also clarify the relationship between the paper in hand and the existing
literature on common agency with externalities. I start with an example in which
there are no efficient equilibria.
Example 1
Assume there are two principals (i = 1, 2) with utility functions ui = a− bi + γbj,
in which a ∈ [0, 1] is the agent’s action, bi ∈ [0, a] is the bid of principal i and γ is
a positive parameter. The utility of the agent is u0 = b1 + b2.
First, I assume γ = 2. In this case, the example satisfies opposing monotonicity,
but violates small externalities. Moreover, as I show in appendix B.2.1 there exists
only one allocation, which is both symmetric and efficient. In this allocation:
a = 1, b1 = b2 = 1 and u0 = u1 = u2 = 2. Henceforth, I call this allocation,
allocation A. However, allocation A is not an equilibrium. To see this, consider any
bidding functions such that bi(1) = 1 for both i and think of the following deviation
by principal 1: b1 = 0, 5 if a = 1 and b1 = 0 for all a 6= 1. Then, no matter what is
the bidding function of principal 2, the agent chooses a = 1 and total bids decrease.
Moreover, as I also show in appendix B.2.1, there are no efficient equilibria in this
example. On the contrary, there is a unique symmetric inefficient equilibrium
which is intuitive10. Specifically, consider the following allocation, which I name
allocation B: a = 1, b1 = b2 = 0. This allocation yields u0 = 0, u1 = u2 = 1 and
can be supported as an equilibrium, by the constant bidding functions bi(a) = 0
for all a ∈ [0, 1].
Allocations A and B illustrate the cause of efficiency failure in common agency
with externalities. This cause is a prisoners’ dilemma. Specifically, the princi-
10 Also, there exist many asymmetric inefficient equilibria that are supported
by implausible off equilibrium strategies. I provide an example in appendix
B.2.1.
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pals can benefit from committing to high bids, as in allocation A. However, this
commitment is not viable. This is so, because each principal has the motive to
unilaterally deviate from any such “agreement” and offer smaller bids. This de-
viation generates a race to the bottom which leads to the inefficient equilibrium
B.
This prisoners’ dilemma also characterizes the examples provided by Peters
(2001) and Martimort and Stole (2002). These authors, observe that externalities
in common agency models might lead to inefficient equilibria. Following this ob-
servation, they suggest an extension of the common agency model. This extension,
allows bids to depend on the biding functions of the other principal and restores
efficiency. This idea in terms of example 1 is as follows: Allocation A is not an
equilibrium because principal 1 deviates. However, if the bids of one principal
depend on the biding function of the other, then principal 2 can use his bidding
function to punish the deviating behaviour and support the equilibrium.
In contrast to this approach, I bypass the solution of the efficiency issue al-
together. Instead, I notice that in certain cases a prisoners’ dilemma does not
appear. Indeed, if γ = 0.5, example 1 satisfies proposition 5. Thus, if a truthful
equilibrium exists it is efficient. Specifically, allocation B is such an equilibrium.
This result, follows from the fact that if γ = 0.5, the principals can not benefit
from high bids. In general, small externalities do not allow for prisoner dilemmas
and therefore lead to efficient equilibria. A similar argument holds for symmetric
negative externalities.
Now I turn to an example which violates proposition 5, but nevertheless has
an efficient equilibrium.
Example 2
Consider a variation of example 1 in which the utility of the agent is u0 = −(b1+b2)
and γ = 2. This example violates both opposing monotonicity and small external-
ities. Yet, allocation B can still be supported as an efficient equilibrium, by the
constant bidding functions bi(a) = 0 for all a.
In this case, allocation B is efficient because the agent dislikes bids. In any
other allocation with a = 1 and positive bids, the principals might be better off
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but the position of the agent deteriorates. This is in contrast to example 1, in
which both principals and agent get worse off, as a result of a decrease in bids.
In example 2, the prisoners’ dilemma between principals remains, however it does
not hinder efficiency, due to the characteristics of the agent’s utility function.
Yet, although allocation B is an efficient equilibrium it is not also a truthful
one. This is so, because the structure of truthful bidding functions renders them
meaningless without opposing monotonicity. Indeed, in such cases truthful bidding
functions fail, since they imply that the principals offer to the agent something he
dislikes. Boultzis (2015), considers an example of this situation.
Examples 1 and 2 above discuss the role of small externalities and opposing
monotonicity in the efficiency of equilibria. In appendix B.2.2, I provide some
additional examples that outline the role of symmetry and quasi-concavity.
Next, I consider economic applications.
6 Applications
In this section, I provide two economic applications of proposition 5.
6.1 Market application
This is a case of market monotonicity and no externalities.
Assume n = 2. The two principals are sellers who sell a homogeneous good.
The agent is a buyer who has decided to buy q units of the good. For example,
think of a government which is in the market for a fixed number of warships.
First, the two sellers submit an offer for a unit price that depends on the
quantity that the buyer buys from each seller. Then, the buyer decides how much
to buy from each seller. This model is known in the literature as split-award
procurement11. Although in this model each seller conditions his price exclusively
on the quantity he sells to the buyer it is still a public common agency model.
This is so because the buyer’s choice is essentially one dimensional. In particular
11 See Anton and Yao (1989) and Chiesa and Denicolo` (2009).
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when the agent chooses to buy quantity q1 from principal 1, this decision also
determines the quantity he buys from principal 2 (q2 = q − q1).
The profit function of seller i is:
Πi = piqi − cq2i .
Here, pi is the unit price, qi stands for quantity and c > 0 is a cost parameter.
The buyer wants to allocate q between the two sellers in a way that minimizes
his expenditure. Thus, the utility of the buyer is:
u0 = −p1q1 − p2(q − q1).
The reservation price for the buyer is p. You can think of the reservation price as
the cost of not buying a unit or as the unit price offered by an outside source.
The bounds that define feasibility for prices are :
pi(qi) = cqi ≥ 0 = pmin and pi(qi) = p.
These conditions reflect the fact that prices must be positive, must not be less
than the average cost and must not exceed the reservation price. Furthermore,
assume p > 3cq.
This model satisfies market monotonicity and lacks externalities. Therefore
it satisfies proposition 5. As I show in appendix B.3.1, solving for a truthful
equilibrium yields the following symmetric outcome:
qi =
q
2
, pi =
3cq
2
, Πi =
cq2
2
while the equilibrium price functions are
pi(qi) =
 cq
2
2qi
+ cqi if qi ≥ p−
√
p2−2c2q2
2c
p if qi <
p−
√
p2−2c2q2
2c
In this model, total cost decreases with the number of producers, because of
the increasing marginal cost. Specifically, the total cost of producing quantity q
of the good is cq2 if there is only one producer, while it is cut in half, if there are
two producers. Consequently, a familiar result emerges.
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Specifically the profits of each principal equal the decrease in the total cost due
to his participation in production. This result is standard for truthful equilibria
in common agency games. In this respect, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) show
that in such cases, each principal receives his contribution to the social surplus12.
I turn now to an application with externalities.
6.2 Lobbying and public goods
I consider an example with lobbying monotonicity and symmetric negative exter-
nalities. In particular, I introduce lobbying to a local public goods model inspired
by Persson and Tabellini (1994).
Consider a federal country with n identical states, each populated by one
individual. In this country, there is a federal government with the sole purpose to
redistribute income across states. This government imposes a tax or subsidy ti to
each of the states. These taxes satisfy:
∑
i
ti = 0.
Each state offers to the federal government a bribe bi in order to affect the choice
of ti. In this respect the utility of the federal government is given by:
u0 =
∑
i
bi.
Moreover, there are two goods in the economy. These goods are the private
good c and the public good G. Each state finances the public good by offering a
voluntary contribution gi. Thus the total amount of public good equals:
G =
∑
i
gi.
An example of such a public good is public safety. Each state decides indepen-
dently how much to spend on the security of its airport. However, since terrorists
12 On the structure of payoffs in such games see also Laussel and Le Breton
(2001) and Villemeur and Versaevel (2003).
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who arrive in one state can move freely to all states, this spending affects safety
in the whole country.
Total spending in each state is financed by an endowment e. This endowment
plus or minus the federal transfer ti is used for private good consumption, contri-
bution to the public good and bribes. Therefore, the budget constraint for each
state is:
e+ ti = ci + bi + gi,
where ti ∈ [−e, e]. Finally the utility in state i is :
ui = ciG.
The timing in this model is as follows: First, a common agency game deter-
mines bribes and transfers. Then, the two states decide on their public good
contributions simultaneously13.
Following this timing, I start by determining the equilibrium public good con-
tributions. Define, ei = e + ti − bi. Then, the unique Nash equilibrium yields
gi = ei −
∑
i ei
n+1
and G =
∑
i ei
n+1
, which implies that:
ui =
(∑
i ei
n+ 1
)2
This function is obviously concave and symmetric with respect to bi, bj. Moreover,
bi is appropriately bounded since:
0 ≤ bi ≤ e+ ti ≤ 2e.
This chain of inequalities implies that bi(·) = bj(·) and bi(·) = bj(·).
Moreover, the derivatives of interest are as follows:
∂u0
∂bi
=1 > 0
∂ui
∂bi
=− 2G < 0
∂ui
∂b˜−i
=− 2G < 0 negative externality
13 Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2003) and Bhaskar and To (2004) also discuss multi
stage models with a separate common agency stage.
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Thus, this game satisfies lobbying monotonicity and negative externalities.
Furthermore it is symmetric and quasi concave and therefore exhibits symmetric
negative externalities. Hence, truthful equilibria are valid. Solving for a truthful
equilibrium yields:
b1 = b2 = 0 and ti ∈ [−e, e] s.t.
∑
i
ti = 0.
Specifically, the functions bi = 0 for all feasible ti can be supported as truthful
responses to each other, relative to the equilibrium utility level ui =
(
ne
n+1
)2
.
Moreover, these functions trivially satisfy conditions (Ai) and (Aii). Finally, when
bribes equal their maximum value (e + ti) the utility of the principals always
equals zero which is its lower bound. Thus, this application satisfies strong deep
pockets, which implies that the suggested allocations also satisfy condition (Bii)
and therefore constitute truthful equilibria.
In this model the agent has no “bargaining power”. Thus, as in similar models
without externalities he ends with nothing. Specifically, since the utility of each
state depends on total income, the government can not affect it by redistributive
transfers. Thus, there is no room for bribes.
6.3 Other applications of proposition 5
The two applications above belong in two of the general settings identified by
proposition 5. I consider them here because they are simple and characteristic
of how proposition 5 can be used. However, proposition 5 considers two more
settings, which I briefly review in the remaining of this subsection.
The first setting incorporates applications which exhibit lobbying monotonicity
and no externalities. This is the case discussed by Dixit et al. (1997). This type
of models is often used to describe situations associated with lobbying. I do
not discuss them any further, since they have been studied extensively in the
literature14.
14 Early examples of this literature are Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit
(1996), Persson (1998), Mitra (1999) e.t.c. More recent examples are Cam-
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The second setting includes models with lobbying monotonicity and small ex-
ternalities. Such situations occur in lobbying models, in which the relation between
the principals goes beyond sharing a common agent, very much like in the appli-
cation in 6.2 above. For example, consider a variation of this application in which
the states have different endowments and the good G is not a pure public good.
In this respect, assume that Gi = gi + γ
∑
i 6=j gj, where Gi is the quantity of good
G consumed by state i and γ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter capturing the externality be-
tween states. This modified application exhibits lobbying monotonicity and small
externalities15.
I turn now to the concluding remarks.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I provide a set of conditions under which truthful equilibria are
valid in common agency models. These conditions generalize the work of Dixit
et al. (1997) and Bernheim and Whinston (1986) on this issue. Furthermore, I
identify two new families of economic applications to which these conditions apply.
In this regard, this paper shows that the scope of truthful equilibria is broader
than believed so far.
In terms of future research my results can be useful in two ways. First, the
conditions listed in proposition 5 apply in a wide variety of economic models. The
validity of truthful equilibria in these models provides for a simple and intuitive
way of solving an otherwise difficult problem. Second, propositions 2-4 can help
identify additional settings in which truthful equilibria are valid in the future.
Thus, the scope of truthful equilibria might be extended even further.
pante and Ferreira (2007), Aidt and Hwang (2008) and Esteller-More´ et
al. (2012) among many others. For a related work see also Felli and Merlo
(2006).
15 Additional details are available upon request
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A Appendix
Proof of proposition 4
Assume the contrary is true. Then, there exists a feasible pair (a∗, b∗) and a
truthful equilibrium of the game (ao, bo(·)), such that u0(a∗, b∗) ≥ u0(ao, bo(ao))
and u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(ao, bo(ao)), with at least one strict inequality. These inequalities
yield:
u0(a
∗, b∗) ≥ u0(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ u0(a∗, bo(a∗))
and
u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ u(a∗, bo(a∗)).
The last inequality in the first expression above holds because (ao, bo(·)) is an
equilibrium. Also, the last inequality in the second expression is due to deep
pockets.
The two chains of inequalities above imply that u0(a
∗, b∗) ≥ u0(a∗, bo(a∗))
and u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(a∗, bo(a∗)), with at least one strict inequality. Then, there is
a contradiction. Indeed, if u0(a
∗, b∗) > u0(a∗, bo(a∗)) it follows from conflict of
interests that there is an i, such that ui(a
∗, b∗) > ui(a∗, bo(a∗)), which contradicts
the second chain of inequalities. Alternatively, if u(a∗, b∗) > u(a∗, bo(a∗)) conflict
of interests implies that u0(a
∗, b∗) > u0(a∗, bo(a∗)), which contradicts the first chain
of inequalities. Q.E.D.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of proposition 1
Proof of (i) I show that the first version of strong deep pockets (D.2.1) im-
plies weak deep pockets (D.1). Let (ao, bo(·)) be a truthful equilibrium and
uo = u(ao, bo(ao)). Also, let (a∗, b∗) be a feasible pair. Because of strong deep
pockets, uoi ≥ ui(a, bi(a), bo−i(a)) for all i and a ∈ A. Then,the definition of truthful
bidding functions implies either a) boi (a
∗) = φi(a∗;uo, bo−i(·)) or b) boi (a∗) = bi(a∗).
If (a) holds, then ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) = uoi , while if (b) holds, then ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) < uoi .
Taking (a) and (b) together yields uoi = ui(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥ ui(a∗, bo(a∗)), for all i.
Since this inequality holds for all feasible pairs, it also holds for the feasible pair in
the definition of weak deep pockets. The proof that the second version of strong
deep pockets implies weak deep pockets is essentially the same. Q.E.D.
Proof of (ii) I consider market monotonicity. The proof for lobbying monotonic-
ity is essentially the same. The fact that market monotonicity implies conflict of
interests in models without externalities is obvious. In what follows I prove that
it also implies weak deep pockets.
Let (ao, bo(·)) be a truthful equilibrium and uo = u(ao, bo(ao)). Then, follow-
ing the definition of weak deep pockets consider a feasible pair (a∗, b∗) such that
u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(ao, bo(ao)) = u(a∗, φ(a∗;uo)). Because u(·) is increasing in own bids
it must be that b∗i ≥ φi(a∗;uo) for all i. Furthermore, since b∗i is feasible it
follows that bmax ≥ b∗i ≥ bi(a∗). Therefore, bmax ≥ φi(a∗;uo). This last inequal-
ity and the definition of truthful responses imply that either boi (a
∗) = φi(a∗;uo)
or boi (a
∗) = bi(a∗). In turn, these equalities along with the feasibility of b∗i im-
ply that b∗i ≥ boi (a∗) for all i. Then, the fact that u0(·) is decreasing in all bids
yields: u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) ≥ u0(a∗, b∗) ≥ u0(ao, bo(ao). If any of these two inequal-
ities is strict then we have a contradiction since (ao, bo(·)) is an equilibrium.
Thus, u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) = u0(a∗, b∗) = u0(ao, bo(ao)). Now, if there exists an i such
that ui(a
∗, boi (a
∗)) > uoi we arrive at a contradiction since the pair (a
o, bo(·)) vio-
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lates trivially the definition of equilibrium. Indeed, in such a case it follows from
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) = u0(ao, bo(ao) that a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o
i (a), b
o
−i(a)). Thus, a
o can
not be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, u(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ u(a∗, bo(a∗)). Q.E.D.
Proof of (iii) Part 1.
First, I show that lobbying monotonicity and small externalities imply conflict of
interests.
The total differential of the utility of the principals is dui =
∂ui
∂bi
dbi +
∂ui
∂b˜−i
db˜−i.
Rearranging terms yields: dui = (
∂ui
∂bi
− ∂ui
∂b˜−i
)dbi +
∂ui
∂b˜−i
db˜.
In order to proceed I need to show two things. First, that when the agent’s
utility increases (db˜ > 0), there is at least one principal who becomes worse off (
dui < 0 for at least one i).
I start with negative externalities ( ∂ui
∂b˜−i
< 0). In this case small externalities
imply that ∂ui
∂bi
− ∂ui
∂b˜−i
< 0. Then, since db˜ > 0 there is at least an i such that
dbi > 0. As a result, dui < 0 for at least one principal.
Now, I turn to positive externalities ( ∂ui
∂b˜−i
> 0). Consider the principal with
the largest increase in bids. Then, for this principal ndbi ≥ db˜. Substituting this
expression in the expression for dui yields dui ≤ (∂ui∂bi + (n − 1) ∂ui∂b˜−i )dbi < 0. The
last inequality follows from small externalities, since ∂ui
∂bi
+ (n− 1) ∂ui
∂b˜−i
< 0.
The second thing I need to show is that if all principals are weakly better
off and at least one is strictly better off (du > 0), then the utility of the agent
decreases (db˜ < 0). Assume the contrary, db˜ ≥ 0. Then, if dbi = 0 for all i it must
be that dui = 0 for all i, which is a contradiction. Thus, for at least an i, it must
be that dbi > 0. Then, for this principal the analysis above implies that dui < 0,
which is a contradiction.
Part 2.
In this part, I show that small externalities along with lobbying monotonicity im-
ply weak deep pockets. I start with the proof of a lemma that I will use later
during the rest of the proof.
Lemma 1
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Consider a game that exhibits small negative externalities and lobbying mono-
tonicity. Then, the following is true:
If b, b´ are feasible for some a ∈ A and there exists an i, such that bi´ > bi and
ui(a, bi´, b˜´−i) ≥ ui(a, bi, b˜−i) then, b˜´ < b˜.
Proof of lemma 1:
Assume the contrary: b˜´ ≥ b˜ ⇒ bi´ − bi ≥ b˜−i − b˜´−i > 0. The last inequality fol-
lows from bi´ > bi, ui(a, bi´, b˜´−i) > ui(a, bi, b˜−i) and negative externalities. Consider
κ ≥ 0 and define ui(κ) = ui(a, bi + κ, b˜−i − κ). Then, ∂ui∂κ = ∂ui∂bi − ∂ui∂b˜−i < 0. The
last inequality is due to small negative externalities. Then, using ∂ui
∂κ
< 0 yields
ui(0) > ui(bi´ − bi) or ui(a, bi, b˜−i) > ui(a, bi´, b˜ − bi´ ) ≥ ui(a, bi´, b˜´−i). The last in-
equality is because by assumption b˜´ ≥ b˜ and negative externalities. This last chain
of inequalities implies ui(a, bi, b˜−i) > ui(a, bi´, b˜´−i), which is a contradiction. This
concludes the proof of the lemma.
I proceed now with the rest of the proof of part 2.
The properties of (a∗, b∗) and (ao, bo(ao)) in the definition of weak deep pockets
imply that u0(a
∗, b˜∗) ≥ u0(ao, b˜o(ao)) ≥ u0(a∗, b˜o(a∗)). In turn, this chain of in-
equalities implies that b˜∗ ≥ b˜o(a∗). Assume there is an i, such that ui(a∗, bo(a∗)) >
ui(a
o, bo(ao)). Then, if b˜∗ = b˜o(a∗) it follows that u0(a∗, b˜∗) = u0(ao, b˜o(ao)) =
u0(a
∗, b˜o(a∗)). In this case there is a contradiction since the pair (ao, bo(·)) violates
trivially the definition of equilibrium. Specifically, it follows from u0(a
∗, b˜o(a∗)) =
u0(a
o, b˜o(ao)) that a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b˜
o(a)). This last observation, along with
ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) > ui(ao, bo(ao)) imply that ao can not be part of an equilibrium.
Therefore, b˜∗ > b˜o(a∗).
Since the utility of the agent is strictly increasing in total bids, u0(a
∗, b˜∗) >
u0(a
∗, b˜o(a∗)). Then, following part 1 of this proof, there exists an i such that
ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) > ui(a∗, b∗) ≥ ui(ao, bo(ao)). For this i, the definition of truthful
responses implies that boi (a
∗) = bi(a∗) ≥ b∗i .
I consider two cases. First, I consider positive externalities. Since ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) >
ui(a
∗, b∗) and boi (a
∗) ≥ b∗i , it must also be that b˜o−i(a∗) ≥ b˜∗−i with at least one strict
inequality. However, in this case b˜o(a∗) > b˜∗, which is a contradiction.
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Second, I turn to negative externalities. In this case, I start by observing that
boi (a
∗) ≥ b∗i does not hold for all i, because if it does, it follows that b˜o(a∗) ≥
b˜∗, which is a contradiction. Thus, there is at least an i, such that boi (a
∗) <
b∗i ≤ bi(a∗). Then, the definition of truthful responses implies that ui(a∗, bo(a∗)) ≤
ui(a
o, bo(ao)) ≤ ui(a∗, b∗). Finally, using lemma 1 yields b˜o(a∗) > b˜∗, which is a
contradiction. Thus u(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ u(a∗, bo(a∗)). Q.E.D.
Proof of (iv)
Conflict of interests.
I prove first that lobbying monotonicity and symmetric negative externalities im-
ply conflict of interests at symmetric allocations.
Consider a game that exhibits lobbying monotonicity and symmetric negative
externalities and let (a, b∗), (a, b) be two feasible pairs and also let (a, b) be sym-
metric. Then I will prove that, (i) if b˜∗ > b˜ there is an i such that ui(a, b∗) < ui(a, b)
and (ii) if u(a, b∗) > u(a, b) then b˜∗ < b˜.
I start with the proof of (i). I assume the contrary: ui(a, b
∗) ≥ ui(a, b), for all
i.
Then, because b˜∗ > b˜, there exists ξi ∈ [−bi, bmax − bi] for all principals i, such
that b∗i = bi + ξi and
∑
i ξi > 0. Moreover, because of the symmetry of the game
and (a, b), it follows from ui(a, b
∗) ≥ ui(a, b) that uk(a, b∗i , b˜∗−i) ≥ uk(a, bk, b˜−k) for
all i and k. Then, the quasi-concavity of uk(·) yields uk(a, 1n
∑
i b
∗
i ,
1
n
∑
i b˜
∗
−i) ≥
uk(a, bk, b˜−k). However, 1n
∑
i b
∗
i =
1
n
∑
i bi +
1
n
∑
i ξi = bk +
1
n
∑
i ξi > bk. Also,
1
n
∑
i b˜
∗
−i =
n−1
n
∑
i bi +
n−1
n
∑
i ξi = b˜−k +
n−1
n
∑
i ξi > b˜−k. Then, because of nega-
tive externalities uk(a,
1
n
∑
i b
∗
i ,
1
n
∑
i b˜
∗
−i) < uk(a, bk, b˜−k), which is a contradiction.
I turn now to (ii). Specifically, I must show that if u(a, b∗) > u(a, b) then
b˜∗ < b˜. Assume the contrary, b˜∗ ≥ b˜. If b˜∗ > b˜ then the analysis above yields a
contradiction. Therefore, b˜∗ = b˜. Using symmetry, u(a, b∗) > u(a, b) implies that
uk(a, b
∗
i , b˜
∗
−i) ≥ uk(a, bk, b˜−k) for all i and k, with at least one strict inequality.
Then, the quasi-concavity of uk(·) yields uk(a, 1n
∑
i b
∗
i ,
1
n
∑
i b˜
∗
−i) > uk(a, bk, b˜−k).
However, 1
n
∑
i b
∗
i =
b˜∗
n
= b˜
n
= bk. Also,
1
n
∑
i b
∗
−i =
(n−1)b˜∗
n
= (n−1)b˜
n
= (n − 1)bk =
b˜−k. These equalities yield uk(a, 1n
∑
i b
∗
i ,
1
n
∑
i b˜
∗
−i) = uk(a, bk, b˜−k), which is a con-
34
tradiction.
Weak deep pockets
I continue to prove that symmetric negative externalities and lobbying mono-
tonicity imply weak deep pockets. In this regard consider such a game and let
(ao, bo(·)) be a symmetric truthful equilibrium and (a∗, b∗) be a feasible pair such
that u0(a
∗, b∗) ≥ u0(ao, bo(ao)) and u(a∗, b∗) ≥ u(ao, bo(ao)) with at least one strict
inequality. Then, I will show that u(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ u(a∗, bo(a∗)).
I start by assuming the opposite. That is, there exists an i for which ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) >
ui(a
o, bo(ao)).
Consider first the case u0(a
∗, b∗) > u0(ao, bo(ao)). Then, u0(a∗, b∗) > u0(ao, bo(ao)) ≥
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) implies that u0(a∗, b∗) > u0(a∗, bo(a∗)). Moreover, for the princi-
pal i above, the definition of truthful responses yields boi (a
∗) = bi(a∗). Then,
symmetry implies that boi (a
∗) = bi(a∗) for all i. Therefore, b˜o(a∗) ≥ b˜∗ and
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) ≥ u0(a∗, b∗) which is a contradiction. The last inequality follows
from the fact that the game is cumulative.
Now I turn to the case u0(a
∗, b∗) = u0(ao, bo(ao)). In this case, if u0(ao, bo(ao)) >
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) the analysis above can be repeated. Thus, u0(a∗, b∗) = u0(ao, bo(ao)) =
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)). This equality implies that a∗ also maximizes the utility of the agent
when the principals submit bo(·). Moreover, because of assuming the contrary in
the beginning of the proof, there exists an i such that ui(a
∗, bo(a∗)) > ui(ao, bo(ao)).
The existence of this principal leads to a contradiction, since ao trivially violates
the definition of equilibrium. Q.E.D.
B.1.2 Proof of proposition 2
Proof of proposition 2
I prove proposition 2 under the assumption of market monotonicity. The proof
for lobbying monotonicity is very similar.
I will show that if any best response of a principal yields a certain utility level
then the truthful response relative to this utility level is also a best response. In
this respect, let boi (·) be a best response of principal i to the bidding functions
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bo−i(·) of the other principals. Then, there exists ao ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o(a)), such
that there does not exist a feasible pair (a∗, b∗i (·)), such that ui(a∗, b∗i (a∗), bo−i(a∗)) >
ui(a
o, bo(ao)) and a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
∗
i (a), b
o
−i(a)) .
Define, uoi = ui(a
o, bo(ao)) and the truthful response of principal i to the bid-
ding functions of the other principals relative to uoi as b
T
i (a; b
o
−i(·), uoi ). For the
shake of simplicity in the remaining of the proof I suppress the other arguments
and write bTi (a). Finally, I define the set A´ = argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
T
i (a), b
o
−i(a)).
If ao ∈ A´ then bTi (a) is trivially a best response since bTi (ao) = boi (ao).
I turn now to the case in which ao /∈ A´. Consider any a´ ∈ A´. Then, I claim that
u0(a´ , b
T
i (a´ ), b
o
−i(a´ )) > u0(a´, b
o(a´ )). If not, then u0(a´, b
o(a´ )) ≥ u0(a´ , bTi (a´ ), bo−i(a´ )) >
u0(a
o, bTi (a
o), bo−i(a
o)) = u0(a
o, bo(ao)). The strict inequality follows from the fact
that ao /∈ A´ while a´ ∈ A´ and the equality from the definition of bTi (·). Thus,
u0(a´, b
o(a´ )) > u0(a
o, bo(ao)) which is a contradiction because ao ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o(a)).
Furthermore, because of market monotonicity the utility of the agent is de-
creasing in all bids. Therefore, u0(a´, b
T
i (a´ ), b
o
−i(a´ )) > u0(a´, b
o(a´ )) implies that
bTi (a´ ) < b
o
i (a´ ) ≤ bi(a´ ). Then, following the definition of truthful responses ei-
ther bTi (a´ ) = φi(a´;u
o
i , b−i(·)) or bTi (a´ ) = bi(a´ ). The last result combined with the
increasing utility of the principals in own bids and the definition of truthful re-
sponses yields ui(a´ , b
T
i (a´ ), b
o
−i(a´ )) ≥ uoi which proves that bTi (·) is a best response.
Q.E.D.
B.1.3 Proof of proposition 3
I prove proposition 3 under the assumption of market monotonicity. The proof
for lobbying monotonicity is very similar.
Proof of 3A
I start with the following lemma.
Lemma
A feasible pair (ao, bo(·)) is an equilibrium if and only if:
(i) ao ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o(a))
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(ii)For all i, (ao, boi (a
o)) ∈ argmax
(a,bi)
ui(a, bi, b
o
−i(a)) subject to a ∈ A, bi = bi(a) for
some feasible bidding function bi(·) and u0(a, bi, bo−i(a)) ≥ max
a´∈A
u0(a´, bmax, b
o
−i(a´ )).
Proof of the Lemma:
Necessity:
Assume that (ao, bo(·)) is an equilibrium but it does not solve the maximiza-
tion problem in condition (ii) of the lemma. Then, there exists an i and a
feasible pair (a∗, b∗i ) which satisfies the constraints in condition (ii) and yields
ui(a
∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)) > ui(ao, bo(ao)).
In this case though, I can show that (ao, bo(·)) is not an equilibrium which
is a contradiction. In order to show this contradiction I need to prove that
there exists a feasible bidding function b∗i (·) such that b∗i (a∗) = b∗i and a∗ ∈
argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
∗
i (a), b
o
−i(a)).
Since (a∗, b∗i ) satisfies the constraints in condition (ii), there exists a feasible
bidding function bˆi(·) such that bˆi(a∗) = b∗i . Define the function ϕi : A → R
implicitly, through u0(a, ϕi, b
o
−i(a)) = u0(a
∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)). The function ϕi(·) always
exists because the utility of the agent is strictly decreasing in all bids. Furthermore,
ϕi(a
∗) = b∗i .
Moreover, because of condition (ii), u0(a
∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)) ≥ max
a´∈A
u0(a´, bmax, b
o
−i(a´ ))
and therefore u0(a, ϕi(a), b
o
−i(a)) = u0(a
∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)) ≥ max
a´∈A
u0(a´, bmax, b
o
−i(a´ )) ≥
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a)) for all a ∈ A.
Since the agent’s utility is strictly decreasing in all bids, this chain of inequal-
ities implies that ϕi(a) ≤ bmax, for all a ∈ A. Define b∗i (a) = max[ϕi(a), bˆi(a)].
Due to ϕi(a) ≤ bmax and the fact that bˆi(·) is feasible, b∗i (a) ∈ [bi(a), bmax] for all
a ∈ A and therefore b∗i (·) is also feasible. Furthermore, bˆi(a∗) = ϕi(a∗) = b∗i and
therefore b∗i (a
∗) = b∗i .
Finally, I observe that
u0(a
∗, b∗i (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) = u0(a∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)) = u0(a, ϕi(a), bo−i(a)) ≥ u0(a, b∗i (a), bo−i(a))
for all a ∈ A. The last inequality follows from the definition of b∗i (·) which im-
plies that b∗i (a) ≥ ϕi(a). This chain confirms that a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
∗
i (a), b
o
−i(a))
which concludes the proof for necessity.
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Sufficiency:
Assume that (ao, boi (a
o)) is a feasible pair that solves the maximization problem
in condition (ii) of the lemma but is not part of an equilibrium and that boi (·) is a
feasible bidding function. Then, there exists a feasible pair (a∗, b∗i (·)) such that:
a)a∗ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
∗
i (a), b
o
−i(a)) and
b)ui(a
∗, b∗i (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) > ui(ao, bo(ao))
However, in this case u0(a
∗, b∗i (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) ≥ u0(a, b∗i (a), bo−i(a)) ≥ u0(a, bmax, bo−i(a)).
The first inequality is due to (a) above, while the second inequality is because b∗i (·)
is feasible and therefore b∗i (a) ≤ bmax for all a ∈ A. As a result, (a∗, b∗i (a∗)) satisfies
the constraints in condition (ii) of the lemma, which implies that (ao, boi (a
o)) does
not solve the maximization problem. This contradiction concludes the proof for
necessity and the lemma.
Now I proceed with the rest of the proof.
Let (ao, bo(·)) be an equilibrium of the game. Consider principal i. I will show that
the inequality in condition (ii) of the lemma, holds as an equality. Assume the con-
trary. Then, if the equilibrium bid equals the maximum bid or boi (a
o) = bmax, the
contradiction is obvious. If on the other hand boi (a
o) < bmax, the pair (a
o, boi (a
o))
does not solve the maximization problem in the lemma. Indeed, in this case, there
exists b∗i such that bmax > b
∗
i > b
o
i (a
o). Then, the feasible pair (ao, b∗i ) satisfies the
inequality constraint in condition (ii) of the lemma because bmax > b
∗
i and yields
ui(a
o, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
o)) > ui(a
o, bo(ao)) because b∗i > b
o
i (a
o). In order to conclude the
proof, I need to show that there exists a feasible biding function b∗i (·) such that
b∗i (a
o) = b∗i . In this respect consider the function b
∗
i =

boi (a) if a 6= ao
b∗i if a = a
o
.
Proof of 3B The last argument proves proposition 3A. I turn now to propo-
sition 3B.
I start with a useful lemma.
Lemma: Maxima inequality.
Consider the feasible bidding functions bo(·). Let a´ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o(a))
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and ao ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
o(a)). Then, u0(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥ u0(a´, bmax, bo−i(a´ )).
Proof: Assume the contrary and consider any a´ ∈ argmax
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o(a)).
Then, u0(a´, bmax, b
o(a´ )) > u0(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥ u0(a´, boi (a´ ), bo−i(a´ )). Therefore, because
the utility of the agent is strictly decreasing in bids it must be that boi (a´ ) > bmax,
which is not possible because bo(·) is feasible. Thus, u0(ao, bo(ao)) ≥ max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o(a)).
I continue now with the rest of the proof. Assume that there exists a pair
(ao, bo(·)) as in the statement of proposition 3B, which is not a truthful equi-
librium. Then, because (ao, bo(·)) is not an equilibrium, there exists an i and a
feasible pair (a∗, b∗i (·)) such that b∗i (a∗) = b∗i , ui(a∗, b∗i , bo−i(a∗)) > uoi and a∗ ∈
argmax
a∈A
u0(a, b
∗
i (a), b
o
−i(a)). Then, the maxima inequality lemma above implies
that u0(a
∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)) ≥ max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a )). Define u
∗
i = ui(a
∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗))
and bTi (·), which is the truthful response of i to bo−i(·) relative to u∗i . Then, bTi (a∗) =
b∗i . Therefore, u0(a
∗, bTi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) ≥ max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a )) = u0(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)). For future reference I name this chain “principal chain”. The first
inequality in this chain is due to the maxima inequality lemma, the equality is
because (ao, bo(·)) satisfies condition (Aii) and the last inequality because it sat-
isfies condition (Ai). The principal chain implies that u0(a
∗, bTi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) ≥
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) and because the utility of the agent is decreasing in all bids it follows
that b∗i = b
T
i (a
∗) ≤ boi (a∗). The last inequality along with the fact that the utility
of the principals is increasing in own bids implies that ui(a
∗, boi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) ≥
ui(a
∗, bTi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) = u∗i > u
o
i . Thus, ui(a
∗, boi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) > uoi , which yields
following the definition of truthful responses boi (a
∗) = bi(a∗). Then, because bTi (·)
is feasible it follows that bTi (a
∗) ≥ bi(a∗) = boi (a∗). Taken together bTi (a∗) ≥ boi (a∗)
and bTi (a
∗) ≤ boi (a∗) imply that bTi (a∗) = boi (a∗).As a result, u0(a∗, bTi (a∗), bo−i(a∗)) =
u0(a
∗, bo(a∗)) and therefore all inequalities in the principal chain hold as equalities.
Thus, u0(a
∗, bTi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) = u0(a∗, boi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) = max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a )) =
u0(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥ u0(a, bo(a)) for all a ∈ A. In this chain the last inequality holds be-
cause of condition (Ai).It follows that both a∗ and ao maximize u0(a, bo(a)) and sat-
isfy conditions (Ai) and (Aii). Therefore, uoi = ui(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥ ui(a∗, boi (a∗), bo−i(a∗)) =
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ui(a
∗, bTi (a
∗), bo−i(a
∗)) = ui(a∗, b∗i , b
o
−i(a
∗)) = u∗i , which is a contradiction because
u∗i > u
o
i . In the last chain the first inequality is because of condition (Bii) and the
equalities because bTi (a
∗) = boi (a
∗). Q.E.D.
B.1.4 Proof of proposition 6
The proof of plausibility and efficiency is the same as in section 2, up to the
necessary transformations of bidding and utility functions16. However, the proof
of calculation requires adjustment. Specifically, the related proof in section 2
follows closely Dixit et al. (1997) and uses a lemma whose proof requires bidding
functions to depend on the entire set A. For this reason, I provide here a new
proof for private games. I only prove 3A, since the proof for 3B is very similar to
the proof in section 2.
I consider again the case of market monotonicity. Assume that the pair
(ao, bo(·)) is an equilibrium and that uo is the vector of equilibrium utilities of
the principals. First, I observe that from the maxima inequality lemma above
(appropriately adapted) it follows that u0(a
o, bo(ao)) ≥ max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a−i)).
I will proceed now to show that this expression holds as an equality. Assume the
contrary: u0(a
o, bo(ao)) > max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a−i)). Then, because the utility func-
tions of the principals and agent are continuous with respect to bids, there exists
b∗i ∈ R such that bmax > b∗i > boi (aoi ), u0(ao, b∗i , bo−i(ao−i)) > max
a∈A
u0(a, bmax, b
o
−i(a−i))
and ui(a
o
i , b
∗
i ) > ui(a
o
i , b
o
i (a
o
i )). However, in this case, the pair (a
o, bo(·)) is not
an equilibrium. To see this consider the following deviation by principal i :
bi =

bmax if ai 6= aoi
b∗i if ai = a
o
i
. Q.E.D.
16 Except from the adjustment of utility and bidding functions, in the proof of
proposition 2 the expression “if ao ∈ A´ ” must be substituted by “if there
exists an a ∈ A´ such that ai = aoi ”.
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B.2 Appendix to discussion
B.2.1 Example 1
First I show that the unique symmetric efficient allocation is a = 1, b1 = b2 =
1. Obviously in any efficient allocation a = 1. Assume there exists an efficient
allocation such that bi < 1 for both i. Then, define µ = 1 − max{b1, b2} > 0.
Consequently, if both the principals increase their bids at a = 1 by µ the utility of
both the principals and the agent increases. Thus, in all efficient allocations a = 1
and at least for one principal bi = 1. In turn, this point implies that there is only
one symmetric efficient allocation in which a = 1 and for both principals bi = 1.
Now I show that there are no efficient equilibria. Consider an efficient alloca-
tion. In any such allocation a = 1 and at least for one principal bi = 1. With-
out loss of generality assume that b1 = 1. Then there are two cases: b2(1) > 0
and b2(1) = 0. If b2(1) = λ > 0 then principal 1 can deviate for example to
b1 =
 1−
λ
2
if a = 1
0 if a 6= 1
. In this case the agent still chooses a = 1 and the
utility of principal 1 increases regardless of his initial off equilibrium strategy.
If instead b2(1) = 0 principal 1 earns u1 = 0. Then, principal 1 can deviate to
b1 = 0 for all a ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, if there exists an a ∈ [0, 1] such that b2(a) > 0
the utility of principal 1 is u1 = a + 2b2 > 0. If on the other hand b2 = 0 for all
a ∈ [0, 1] the agent is indifferent among all a. Then, any a > 0 maximizes the
utility of the agent and leaves the principal better off. For example, if the agent
chooses a = 1, principal 1 earns utility u1 = 1 > 0.
Finally, as an example of an asymmetric inefficient equilibrium consider the
following: b1 =

0.2 if a = 1
0 if a 6= 1
, b2 =

0.2 if a = 0.2
0 if a 6= 0.2
. These bidding func-
tions yield a = 1, b1 = 0.2, b2 = 0, u0 = 0.2, u1 = 0.8, u2 = 1.4.
B.2.2 Symmetric negative externalities
Examples 1 and 2 highlight the role of symmetry.
Example 1
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Consider a game with two principals in which u0 = b1 + b2, ui = a − bi − 2bj,
a ∈ [0, 1] and bi(0) ∈ [0, 5] for both i. This game is symmetric and quasi-concave.
Define allocation A as a = 0 and b1 = b2 = 1. For this allocation u0 = 2 and
u1 = u2 = −3.
Graph 1 describes this situation. In this graph I0, I1 and I2 are the indifference
curves for the agent and the two principals that go through point A. The utility of
the principals increases at allocations that lie to the south west of point A, while
the utility of the agent at allocations that lie to the north east of the same point.
In this regard the shaded area f depicts the allocations that make both principal 1
and the agent better off than in A. In a similar manner, the shaded area g depicts
the same allocations for the agent and principal 2. The fact that the areas f and
g intersect only at point A implies conflict of interests.
b1
b2
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2
3
1
2
3
2
3
A
I1
I2
I0
f
g
Graph 1
Symmetry and quasi-concavity.
Example 2
Let me now consider an example in which there is no conflict of interests. Consider
a variation of the previous game in which u0 = b1 + b2, u1 = a − b1 − 2b2 and
u2 = a−b1−4b2. This game is quasi-concave but not symmetric. Define allocation
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A as a = 0, b1 = 1 and b2 = 1. This allocation yields u0 = 2, u1 = −3 and u2 = −5.
Graph 2 reproduces graph 1 for this example. However, in this case, because of
asymmetry, there are allocations that make both principals and the agent better
off than in A. The shaded area in graph 2 depicts these allocations. The existence
of such allocations violates conflict of interests.
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Graph 2
Quasi-concavity without symmetry.
Now I turn to quasi-concavity. Examples 3 and 4 that follow highlight its role.
Example 3
Consider a game in which u0 = b1 + b2, u1 = a− b1− b22, u2 = a− b2− b21, a ∈ [0, 1]
and bi(0) ∈ [0, 3] for both i. This game is both symmetric and quasi-concave.
Define allocation A as a = 0 and b1 = b2 = 1, which yields u0 = 2, u1 = −2 and
u2 = −2. Then, graph 3 depicts the respective indifference curves. As in graph 1
the shaded areas f and g depict the allocations that make the agent and one of
the principals better off than in A. Again, the fact that f and g intersect only in
A, implies conflict of interests.
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Graph 3
Symmetry and quasi-concavity (2).
I turn now to example 4.
Example 4
Consider a variation of example 3 in which u0 = b1 + b2, u1 = a− b1 − 2
√
b2 and
u2 = a − b2 − 2
√
b1. This game is symmetric but not quasi concave. Graph 4 re-
produces graph 3 for this example. The shaded area depicts the set of allocations
that make both the principals and the agent better off than in A. The fact that
this set is not empty violates conflict of interests.
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Symmetry without quasi-concavity.
B.3 Appendix to applications
B.3.1 Market application
In order to solve this problem I use proposition 3B. First I observe that the lower
bound of profits is zero. This bound is always reached when the price also takes
its lower bound which is equal to the average cost. Thus, this game satisfies strong
deep pockets and consequently condition (Bii). Therefore, an allocation of profits
(Πi) and quantities (qi) which satisfies conditions (Ai) and (Aii) gives rise to a
truthful equilibrium.
I proceed by solving the profit function with respect to pi which yields: pi =
Πi+cq
2
i
qi
≡ ϕ(qi; Πi). I guess that this function is the equilibrium price function
around the equilibrium quantities. In such a case, when both sellers offer this
price function the agent faces the following problem:
max
q1∈[0, q]
−p1q1 − p2(q − q1)
The unique solution to this problem is qi =
q
2
, which is independent of Πi. Thus
for this quantity condition (Ai) is satisfied.
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I turn now to condition (Aii) which I use to calculate the equilibrium Πi. First,
I notice that because of symmetry Πi = Πj ≡ Π. Then, I guess that when seller
j submits the reservation price the buyer buys all the quantity from principal i.
Under this guess, condition (Aii) becomes −2Π− c q2
2
= −Π− cq2, which in turn
yields Π = Πi = c
q2
2
. I substitute Πi in ϕi(·) and get ϕ(qi) = cq22qi + cqi. Then, in
order to verify my first guess I need to show that c q
2
≤ ϕ( q
2
) ≤ p and in order to
verify the second that ϕ(q) ≤ p.
I proceed, by solving the equation p =
c q
2
2
+c(q∗i )
2
q∗i
with respect to q∗i in order to
calculate the quantity q∗i at which the price hits the upper bound. This exercise
yields: q∗i =
p−
√
p2−2c2q2
2c
. In this way I obtain the price function pi(·) that I
provide in the main text. Moreover, I find that ϕ(qi) < p for all qi > q
∗
i . Then,
the assumption p > 3cq implies that q
2
> q∗i and ϕi(qi) ≥ cqi for all qi ∈ [0, q].
These results verify both my guesses and confirm that the proposed equilibrium
price function satisfies proposition 3B.
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